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Introduction
Since the establishment of the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1957, the agricultural sector has
played a central role in developing the integral economic,
commercial and structural policy of the new Foundation
formulated in the Treaty of Rome. Several reasons can be
put forward for this:
Firstly, agricultural activity was always one of the most
essential factors in European economic, social and cultural
life. Secondly, the agricultural sector was, historically
speaking, a major source of claims and tensions amongst
European nations and countries. Thirdly, European farmers
had (and still have) a strong political influence in the
parliamentarian regimes in the democratic systems of
Europe. Fourthly, and most importantly, in the post-war
period and following the tragic experience of World War II,
a strategic choice for most European countries was to
rapidly achieve and guarantee food security.
Additionally, it was always realized (and the Council
has repeatedly pointed out) that European agriculture has
its own specific nature and characteristics related to:
• its territorial coverage;
• the existence of different regions with specific features
(e.g. less-favoured areas, remote and mountainous
regions, arid and semi-arid regions, urban or high
population density regions);
• the large number of family-type farms (a total of 8
million holdings, three times more than in USA) with
a small average size (15 hectares in the EU-15
compared to 185 hectares in the USA). In fact, the
majority of European farms are considered to be
‘small’, since 5 million holdings are still under 5
hectares in area, their farmers faced with (geo-physical)
competitive disadvantages when compared to their
counterparts in the other high-industrialized countries,
i.e. the USA;
• the diversity of European agricultural products and
the big differences in yields;
• the multiple roles increasingly assumed by farmers
and the agricultural sector in general.
In relation to the above, the Common Agricultural
Policy (henceforth referred to as the CAP) was formally
announced in 1957 as one of the key elements of the first
Treaty of Rome. It was designed to serve the objectives
stated in Article 33 of the Consolidated Treaties (ex
Article 39 TEC), taking into account the policy objectives,
according to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, of ‘cohesion’
(Title XVII of the Consolidated Treaties, ex Title XIV
TEC) and ‘environment’ (Title XIX, ex Title XVI).
In that respect, the CAP, which has been the most
important (sectoral) policy of the EU right from the start,
stands at the heart of the European integration process. In
fact, the function of the CAP has been considered as a
‘cornerstone’ of the integration process itself, since it is
the most comprehensive common policy developed and
pursued by the EU and is related, to a certain extent, to
most other sectoral policies (structural, social,
environment, competition, trade, transport, etc.).
In the some 40 years that the CAP has been in force,
the role of agriculture as an economic sector in the EU has
steadily declined, accounting today for about 2.5% of
total Gross Value Added, whilst agricultural commodities
represent almost 9% of total exports and 11-12% of total
imports. The contribution of the sector to employment,
although it too has dramatically declined, is still substantial
since around 16 million people (5.3% of the total
workforce, compared to 2.5% in the USA) still work on
farms. However, in 25% of the rural areas of the EU
(mainly the less developed and less favoured areas),
agriculture still absorbs 10-15% of the labour force.
Moreover, taking into account other upstream and
downstream activities such as inputs purchased by farmers,
food processing and distribution, wholesale and retail
sales outlets, rural tourism and leisure pursuits, it is true
to say that agriculture has a much wider impact on the
European economy than figures for output, trade and
employment would indicate.
Additionally, from another point of view, there is a
common belief that the role of agriculture has been
broadened in the 1990s through a change in the concepts
involved:
• As an economic activity, agriculture has, not only to
guarantee food security, but also to provide high-
quality food and non-food products responding to
new consumer requirements, started to ensure efficient
production and competitive prices in both internal
and external markets;
• There is a growing recognition that agriculture plays
an increasingly important role in the maintenance,
protection and development of the environment;
• Agriculture is an important factor when it comes to
contributing to balanced economic and social life in
rural areas and it should therefore form an essential
part of a sustainable, multi-sectoral integrated rural
development policy. It should be mentioned that rural
areas account for 80% of EU territory and for over
25% of its population.
1. The 1992 reform of the CAP
Up until 1992, the basic concept behind the CAP was to
provide a framework of support and protection for
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agriculture, almost exclusively based on a price support
mechanism, as a means of increasing agricultural output
and productivity and securing agricultural income. The
most important feature of this mechanism was to ensure
that Community farmer prices were higher that the world
average.
This system proved successful in implementing most
of the initial objectives of the CAP, allowing the EEC to
move quite quickly from a complete deficit to a surplus
of production in the main products and therefore to
transform the EU from a net importer to a net exporter on
the world market.
The CAP developed spectacularly over time, although
various policy adjustments took place in the meantime in
order to respond to economic or market developments
and cope with budgetary difficulties. The most important
of these was the 1992 reform which served the same
objectives but at the same time took a decisive step
towards market orientation by gradually changing the
basic mechanisms of the CAP from a price support
system towards direct income support.
The measures adopted under the 1992 reform were
designed to achieve the following main objectives:
• To improve the competitiveness of EC agricultural
products on the home and export markets, by means
of adequate price cuts which, among other things,
would allow the halt in the fall in the use of cereals in
animal feed (the latter was considered important
because, due to the price differentials between high
internal prices of cereals and low prices of imported
oilseed substitutes, the internal market for animal
feed had been lost);
• To effectively control production and bring it down to
levels more in line with market demand by
implementing an obligation for cereal farmers to take
a certain proportion of arable land out of production
each year (set-aside), by introducing incentives for
voluntary and/or permanent set-aside, and by applying
quantitative restrictions, either by decreasing quotas
(milk, tobacco) or setting a limit on the number of
animals qualifying for premiums;
• To secure stable incomes for Community farmers, with
price cuts accompanied by direct compensatory aid,
and focus income support where it is most needed
(through special treatment for small producers),
contributing therefore to lowering inequalities in income;
• To establish or reinforce accompanying measures
aiming to relate the CAP to environmental
considerations through agro-environmental action,
incentives for afforestation and the application of an
early-retirement scheme.
2. General assessment of the impact of the 1992
reform
With the reform now almost complete, one could argue
that important innovations were introduced and certain
achievements made:
1. Price cuts, in combination with the introduction of
direct compensatory payments, constituted the first
decisive move towards decoupling support from
production and trade.
2. The reform succeeded in drastically reducing the
public intervention stock in most of the reformed
sectors, thereby preventing any increases in cereal
production and getting surpluses under control.
3. The cut in the price of cereals made domestic grain
more competitive; in turn, using cereals as feedstuffs
led to a reduction in the cost of inputs for livestock
products and the market share of domestic grain
increased by supplying more domestically produced
grain for use as animal feed.
4. The gap between world and domestic prices, though
not eliminated, decreased considerably, given that, at
the same time, the average level of world prices
increased.
5. New rules and incentives were introduced to promote
and improve the quality and competitiveness of EC
products, (labelling and certification of guaranteed
quality, promotion of biological production methods,
protection of geographic origin and other indications
of product origin, standardization, diversification of
products according to regional specialities and
traditional processes, etc.).
6. In the beef & veal sector, stocks were initially
eliminated and there was a market recovery up to
1995, but the BSE crisis which appeared in the
meantime revived the problem and surpluses thus
reappeared.
7. Income support is now provided through the
mechanism of direct income compensation rather
than through the mechanism of market prices. In most
cases, income compensation has counterbalanced
losses from price cuts.
8. Income compensation aids are related to the policy of
production control, through set-aside, limiting the
number of animal heads qualified for premiums, etc.
However, the problem here is that such aids are not
considered to be completely decoupled from
production, since they are calculated on the grounds
of a historically determined basic area/yield and
number of animals (in order to discourage further
increases in yields and production).
9. The distinction between ‘large’ and ‘small’ farmers
(the latter determined as those who do not produce
more than 92 tonnes of cereals) allowed financial
support to be more targeted at the most vulnerable
categories of farmers. In particular, the small cereal
farmers, though qualified for full compensation, were
not subject to set-aside requirements, enabling them
therefore to stay in production.
10.With regard to environmental effects, assessments of
the reform are rather mixed; on the one hand,
extensification incentives allowed a decrease in the
use of fertilizers and pesticides and has meant that
farmers now play a more energetic role in protecting
the environment, but there were also some negative
effects such as excessive irrigation or the abandonment
of certain areas. However, in combination with the
other accompanying measures, such as afforestation,
structural measures and early retirement, the overall
result can be counted as positive.
11.Finally, the reform allowed the EU to comply with the
commitments of the Uruguay Round Agreement in
Agriculture (GATT).24
In general, therefore, for those who believed that the
CAP was on the verge of collapse, reform was the best
way of ensuring its continued existence.
However, it would seem that some negative effects
also appeared as a result of the reform:
1. Budgetary expenditure rose in absolute terms as a
result of compensatory payments (though within the
guideline figures).
2. Cereal producers are currently considered to be over-
compensated, since they still receive full compensation
for price cuts that have not been reflected in the
market, because world prices have in the meantime
increased at higher than pre-1992 levels.
3. The administration involved in implementing the
new policy became more complicated and costly,
leading to calls to simplify the EU law concerned.
4. The set-aside scheme represents a loss in terms of
economic efficiency, because it takes out of production
land which is a scarce production factor in certain
regions of Europe.
5. The disparities in farm incomes between individual
Member States and regions remain a problem due to
the differences in farm size, yields, the degree of
commercialization and the general socio-economic
and structural environment.
6. The problem of potential overproduction in the
medium or long term has not been completely resolved,
since yields and productivity continue to increase as
a result of advanced technology and innovations.
3. Current pressures for further reform
The transitional period of the 1992 reform came to an end
in July 1995. At the same time, the GATT agreement on
agriculture entered into force, while the EU was enlarged
with three new members and the CEECs submitted their
applications for accession.
Under these developments, the CAP could not stay
intact. New pressures appeared advocating a deeper reform
through moving further towards more competitive EC
prices in line with world levels.
The main reasons for further reform are:
• The risk of new market imbalances that could occur
at the beginning of the next century;
• The prospect of a new trade round in the WTO,
expected to push further for the liberalization of the
trade in agricultural products;
• The limitations on the agricultural budget which
continue to be bound up with the principle of budgetary
discipline being followed since the 1980s;
• The aspiration towards a more ‘environmentally-
friendly’ and quality-oriented agriculture,
• A growing need for a fully fledged rural development
policy;
• Finally, the prospect of enlargement to include the
CEECs and Cyprus.
All those factors have a certain impact on the future
orientations of the CAP.  They are to a certain extent
interrelated in the sense that the impact of the one
influences the impact of the other and therefore cannot be
considered separately.
However, among the above pressures, enlargement,
the next WTO Round and the budgetary framework for
the CAP seem to be the main sources behind the need for
further reform.
For instance, many recent reports and studies
emphasize the fact that enlargement would be the catalyst
for the so-called ‘reform of the reforms’. Other reports
have already argued that, if the existing policies for the
major agricultural commodities remain unchanged, the
EU will soon (even without enlargement) again face a
serious crisis of over-production, which will create a
conflict with its commitments under the Uruguay Round
Agreement.
With relation to enlargement in particular, agriculture
has been characterized as a key element in the pre-
accession strategy, determining, to a large extent, the
success or not of the future integration of the candidate
countries. This is due to the fact that, for the time being,
considerable differences exist between the agricultural
situation in the candidate countries and the Member
States, especially in terms of structures and prices.
4. Reform options
In November 1995, the European Commission presented
its ‘Agricultural Strategy Paper’ in which different options
were examined for the future development of the CAP in
the light of future developments, in particular enlargement
to the east. Broadly speaking, these options fall into three
categories:
I. Maintaining the Status Quo
Regardless of future enlargement, this option was almost
unanimously rejected as unrealistic. The reason for this is
that as world agricultural markets become more and more
liberalized, under the present regime the competitiveness
of EU agricultural products risks being severely
undermined.
As productivity rises, any excess subsidized
production in the near future could not be oriented towards
external markets, due to the tightness of the GATT
commitments. In turn, growing surpluses would lead to
market imbalances and, therefore, once again, a major
CAP reform would, sooner or later, become unavoidable.
The problem would become more acute if the CAP
were to be extended in its current form to the CEECs after
enlargement. The main difficulties that might thereby
arise can be identified as follows:
(a) International agricultural commitments
It should be reiterated that the most important
commitments under the GATT agreement (1993) entailed
a 20% reduction in domestic support for agriculture in
terms of an Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). The
EC variable levies on agricultural imports would thus be
transformed into tariffs (tarification of the border
protection) which would be reduced by 36% over six
years. The volume of subsidized exports would be reduced
by 21% and spending on export subsidies by 36% on a
product by product basis.
An upward alignment of farm support prices in the
CEECs to meet those currently applying in the EU would
generate an increase in total agricultural support and this
would seriously affect the domestic support discipline.25
Additionally, the upper volume and value export
restrictions that have been agreed for the present GATT
members would have to be redistributed among the EU
and the new Members, which would surely lead to
additional CAP reform at a later stage.
Furthermore, taking into account the fact that the next
WTO Round will call for negotiations on further
agricultural liberalization, one can anticipate that EU
enlargement will not be concluded without prior
negotiations on additional commitments.
(b) Budgetary implications
It should be mentioned that total CAP expenditure,
represented by the Guarantee Section of the Agricultural
Fund, is limited by the agricultural financial guideline
ceiling. This guideline increases each year by almost
74% of GNP growth in real terms and is estimated at
some ECU 43 billion for 1999. For the time being (1997
data), Guarantee expenditure amounts already amount to
about ECU 41.3 billion (Guidance Section: 3.6 billion)
and constitute a decreasing but still very high percentage
(49.2%) of the total EU Budget (ECU 82.4 billion in
1997).
According to the available data, however, the accession
of the CEECs would double the agricultural labour force
and lead to a 50% increase in agricultural land. Expanding
the present CAP to the applicant countries could therefore
imply a 50% increase in the cost of the CAP.  However,
within existing budgetary limits, and given that the present
Member States would not tolerate a significant increase
in their contributions to increase the CAP budget, it is
clear that the EU could not afford the cost of such an
expansion.
Moreover, with the budgetary constraints remaining
unchanged, the full implementation of the existing rules
would cause a struggle between the eventual new Member
States and the existing ones, due to the implied
redistribution of already scarce funds.
(c) Market price implications for the CEECs
The existing price gap between the EU and the CEECs is
expected to narrow over the coming years, but will
certainly not disappear.
If the CEEC prices were to be aligned to present EU
levels after their accession, this would lead to significant
price increases which could stimulate production but
would also depress consumption. Since incomes are low
in the applicant countries and households spend a larger
proportion of their income on food (30-60% compared to
19% in the EU), higher food prices could provoke social
unrest and political instability. At the same time, higher
food prices could lead to lower GDP growth if they result
in higher inflation, which in turn forces up interest rates.
Furthermore, higher farm-gate prices would also have
a rather negative impact on the food industry by increasing
the cost of raw materials in the processing sector, the
competitiveness of which is relatively low and which has
not yet been fully restructured.
Additionally, if stimulation caused by higher prices
were to lead to excess production, the CEECs would have
to export onto the world market without subsidies due to
the constraints imposed by the Uruguay Round agreement.
Due to the current market situation in the CEECs, a
price alignment strategy would in general imply significant
increases in their support and protection levels which
would not be in line with the WTO schedules of the
countries concerned.
II. Radical reform
In budgetary terms, this option appears quite attractive
and would certainly simplify negotiations for enlargement.
However, it was also rejected for a number of other
political, socio-economic and environmental reasons.
A radical reform would imply an elimination of the
total support system by drastically reducing EU prices to
world market levels and abolishing production quotas
and other supply management measures without time for
necessary adjustments.
Due to the special characteristics of EU agriculture,
however, the great majority of its farmers could not
afford a drastic reduction of EU prices without
compensation. In fact, most of them would be forced out
of the sector, as they could not survive in complete market
liberalization conditions.
In turn, this would lead to the abandonment of land,
which would have great environmental repercussions
and lead to the high social cost of unemployed farmers
seeking a job outside agriculture. It would therefore be
necessary to allocate a huge amount for income
compensation (full or partial through direct payments)
the cost of which the EU budget could not cover.
Certain circles have advocated the transfer of direct
income and environmental support payments from the
Community to national budgets, with or without
Community co-financing. However, such a ‘solution’
would practically imply a full or partial renationalization
of the CAP, to which the vast majority of Member States,
especially the weaker ones, are opposed. Renationalization
would, inter alia, mean abandoning (instead of driving
forward) integration, plus the abolishing ‘financial
solidarity’ (one of the three fundamental principles of the
CAP). It would also go against the economic and social
cohesion strategy, since the weaker Member States would
have to spend more of their national budgets to compete
in internal market conditions.
III. Developing the 1992 Reform
The 1992 approach emphasized the need to improve the
competitiveness of EU agricultural products on the home
and export markets by increasing the market orientation
of the sector.
This implied that the price support system would be
gradually diminished, while farmers would be
compensated through direct payments for significant
price cuts. Those payments (arable payments, animal
premiums, accompanying measures) are subject to
budgetary margins under the present guideline and in the
framework of the new financial perspectives for after
1999.
The main target of this policy was to reduce the gap
between the EU internal price level and world prices for
a number of key products and to draw a clearer distinction
between market policy and income support. Meanwhile,
income support is considered as a strong incentive for26
farmers to adjust their structures and make farming
activity viable enough to compete on the internal and
external market.
In the light of eastward enlargement in particular, the
persistence of this policy in the future will facilitate the
integration of the agricultural sector of the new Member
States to a great extent as the gap between current EU
prices and prices in the CEECs will be eliminated in the
pre-accession period.
The option of continuing with the 1992 reform
therefore looks to be the most feasible way of developing
the CAP for the future, being considered as a less distorting
policy strategy from an economic point of view.
The main goals of this concept are to move the sector
towards greater market orientation and higher
competitiveness, combined with a greater emphasis on
rural development policies as a means of addressing the
problems of rural areas. The OECD claims that such a
policy could serve the interests of both the EU and the
CEECs.
5. Agenda 2000 proposals
The strict application of the financial guideline during the
last decade allowed the relative share of agricultural
spending in the total budget to fall substantially. However,
the truth is that almost 50% of the EU budget is still being
spent on agriculture, although, as a declining economic
sector, it does not create new jobs. On the contrary, for
many reasons, potential young farmers are seeking either
to move to other sectors of the economy or to find
additional sources of income outside agriculture.
Therefore, criticism focuses more and more on the
fact that agriculture absorbs huge amounts of money,
depriving other policies and tasks of the EU of their
potential to create new jobs due to a lack of appropriate
financial resources necessary for their development.
The most interesting aspect of Agenda 2000 seems
therefore to be the Commission’s attempt to define new
or rather additional objectives of the CAP, by extending
it to a rural development strategy. More precisely, the
Commission seeks to:
• focus CAP policy on food safety and quality;
• guarantee decent living standards for farmers;
• integrate environmental objectives into the CAP;
• create alternative sources of income and employment
in rural areas;
• simplify EU agricultural law.
To reach these objectives, and taking into account the
implications of new Member States entering the CAP, the
European Commission proposes to deepen and extend
the 1992 reform, that is to introduce further price cuts for
key products and continue the shift from the price support
system to direct payments.
Owing to the fear of new market imbalances, likely to
appear in the years to come, and the growing competition
on both the external and internal markets (through
increased market access), the Commission argues that a
policy aimed at improving competitiveness should be the
most important target of the CAP in the future (as in the
recent past).
In that sense, the most important proposals are follows:
• A one-step drop in the intervention price of cereals
(the most important ‘key’ product) through a 20%
reduction in the price currently applied. In fact, up to
now, the success of the 1992 reform on cereals has
brought EU prices down to a level which is no more
than 10% to 15% above world market prices.
Therefore, the partial target for the EU would be to
take the final step towards closing this gap and making
EU grain production fully competitive with world
production;
• An increase in the compensatory direct payment for
arable crops which should only partly offset the
reduction in the institutional price, in order to avoid
any over-compensation in this sector;
• Aligning the oilseeds regime to that of cereals by
reducing the (fluctuated) direct aid currently paid, but
overcoming the additional commitments imposed on
this sector according to the Blair House Agreement
(GATT);
• Fixing the obligatory set-aside rate at 0% (maintaining
the system as a ‘safety net’), while also maintaining
voluntary set-aside (with the same specific aid as for
crops);
• Gradually reducing the market support of beef by
30%, with the elimination of intervention and
maintenance of aid for private storage. Compensation
for losses incurred is proposed through an increase in
the various premiums/direct payments per head:
suckler cows (+ECU 70), young bulls (+ECU 233),
bulls (+ECU 123) and a new premium for dairy cows
(ECU 70);
•A   cautious approach to the dairy products sector, by
continuing the quota regime until 2006, gradually
reducing support prices by 10% and introducing a
new annual compensatory payment for dairy cows in
addition to the new premium;
• A reform of all the other products will be proposed at
a later stage on a basis similar to the above.
Generally, in the cases of products for which internal
prices continue to stand well above the world level and
where a full elimination of this price gap cannot be
completed at once, supply management measures (quotas,
intervention mechanisms etc.) will continue to be applied
but more strictly.
Assuming that world prices are likely to remain well
below the present EU level, lowering EU prices to world
level would be one of the necessary steps required for the
EU to participate fully in the expected expansion in world
trade by increasing the possibilities of exports without
subsidies.
These are the specific proposals related to market
operation. However, higher competitiveness is also
connected with efforts to differentiate EU agricultural
production. In this respect, a number of measures have
already been adopted and are to be strengthened, the aim
of which is to:
• Improve quality standards and specificity of EU
products, respond to consumer demand preferences
(denotation of origin, geographical indications,
biological products etc.);
• Increase value added through processing;27
• Secure food safety and consumer health;
• Promote structural measures to lower production
cost;
• Improve distribution and marketing conditions.
On 18-19 November 1997, EU farm ministers agreed
on a common position on the Commission’s proposals,
reaching agreement on most points.
According to the Ministers’ position, the reform
should mainly aim at a combination of reduced price-
support measures and compensation through direct aids
as well as flanking measures.
The reform should be designed in such a way as to
arrive at economically sound, viable solutions which are
socially acceptable, make it possible to ensure fair
incomes, to strike a fair balance between production
sectors, producers and regions and to avoid distortion of
competition.
As regards enlargement, the reform model will serve
as a frame of reference for the future efforts of the
applicant countries to adjust their agricultural policies to
the CAP.
6. Implications of the proposals
1. The major target of the new reform is to achieve a
more market-orientated agricultural system in which
EU prices will closely reflect those on the world
market. On the assumption that world prices will not
change dramatically from today’s level, a 20% cut in
cereal prices should eliminate or reduce substantially
the export subsidies and the storage cost in this sector,
therefore generating savings of around ECU 5 billion
by 2006.
However, all the existing mechanisms of the Common
Organization of Market (COM) for cereals will remain
in place even after the implementation of the reform
programme in order to keep it legally possible to
regulate the cereals market.
In this respect, a minimum of support is still available,
just in case. Therefore, the set-aside mechanism also
remains also in place, even if the standard rate would
normally be zero. The intervention system would still
be functional, even if the intervention price post-2000
would be reduced to a level which would normally be
well below market levels.
2. Increases in compensatory payments would only cover
half the amount representing the 20% cut of the
intervention price, for two reasons:
a) to avoid over-compensation
b) actual market prices are unlikely to follow the fall
of intervention prices to the full extent.
However, with zero set-aside and the compensatory
payments being paid equally to all farmers and
according to the previous yields of the area they
cultivate, the previous distinction between large and
small producers (see above) will no longer have
practical implications for arable crops. If this
distinction is still to make sense, small producers will
have to maintain some other advantage in relation to
the large ones, so as to be able to survive under the
new reform. In that respect, various measures are
proposed; i.e. differentiating the amount of
compensation for large and small farmers by providing
the latter with full (instead of partial) compensation,
and/or putting an upper ceiling on the compensation
awarded to large producers.
3. A major result of the changes in the compensatory
subsidy structure is likely to be a substantial reduction
in the area and production of oilseeds. On the
assumption that present market price levels for cereals
will be maintained beyond 2001, the Commission’s
intention to align the current oilseed compensatory
payment on a single payment for all arable crops will
perhaps result in a substantial reduction in the
profitability of oilseed.
In this case, the decrease in oilseed production will
have some additional implications:
– It is likely to lead to further intensification of the
production of wheat;
– Given that in many areas all of the most suitable
wheat-growing land is already fully utilized, a
further increase in the area allocated for wheat
will lead to the lower quality of a portion of wheat
production, which will be difficult to market on
either the domestic or international markets;
– Many areas of the EU will be led further towards
monoculture, with consequently harmful effects
on the environment;
– The dependence of the EU on oilseed imports
from the USA and other competitors will increase.
The Commission, however, refuses to acknowledge
such a prospect. It argues that the deterioration in the
relative profitability of oilseed production can be
counteracted by six factors:
(a) Generalizing the compensatory payments for all
main arable products will automatically result in
lifting the Blair House limitations on the EU
oilseeds area, increasing it to an effective 4.9
million hectares;
(b) Due to the operation of the Marginal Guaranteed
Area (MGA) mechanism, which penalizes farmers
for exceeding the Blair House limits, the current
compensatory payments have in fact been lower
than they could be;
(c) Market price increases could compensate to a
great extent for the reduction in compensatory
payments;
(d) The effective abolition of arable set-aside would
allow for an increase in the oilseeds area if
profitability is great enough;
(e) Oilseeds play an important husbandry role in
arable rotations;
(f) World prices for oilseeds are likely to increase
sufficiently to encourage an increase in output.
Furthermore, the expected increase in oilseeds yield,
due to biotechnological innovations and the fact that
the EU produces only 44% of its current consumption,
are also factors that may counterbalance the fall in the
aid currently paid. From a budgetary point of view,
however, the cut in the oilseeds premium will result
in further savings of around ECU 3.6 billion.
4. The Commission receives a lot of criticism for leaving
the dairy and sugar key sectors largely untouched,
while the Mediterranean products (olive oil, wine,28
rice, tobacco, cotton) are left out, without any specific
orientation of their future Market Organization.
Apart from the criticism that has already been levelled
against the proposals, one question continues to dominate
the various discussions, i.e. that as to the future form of
compensation to EU farmers for the proposed further
price cuts. One should take into account the following
parameters:
• The cereal aid scheme applied up to now was fixed
and not linked to changes in world market prices
(unlike the oilseeds payments which can be adjusted
up and down to reflect market price movements);
• Other major competitors of the EU on the world
market (who are preparing themselves for the next
WTO Round), have already argued that compensatory
payments for cereals are a kind of ‘hidden export
subsidy’ and therefore oppose the GATT commit-
ments;
• It is quite likely that the above concept will become a
major point in the coming agricultural trade
negotiations, given that the current Uruguay Round
agreement exempts compensatory payments from
subsidy reductions (‘blue box’ agreement). In this
case, maintaining ‘blue box’ status for the
compensatory aids in general would seem to be one of
the targets of the EU for the forthcoming WTO
negotiations.
Additionally, apart from their high cost for the
Community budget, the justification for the compensatory
payments of the 1992 approach will probably be
increasingly challenged in the future, especially because
the question of when they will be phased out has been left
open.
In that respect, it should be noted that compensatory
payments were introduced to compensate certain price
cuts. In relation to enlargement, and given that CEEC
prices are not going to be reduced but most likely increased
following accession, the Commission argues that CEEC
farmers would not be eligible for reform compensation
since they would not have suffered any price cuts.
Otherwise, adding the direct payments to expected price
increases, would represent an inordinate cash injection
for many CEEC farmers. Such a development would risk
creating disparities in income that could rapidly lead to
social tension in those countries and regions.
However, it is equally under question whether it
would be possible, both economically and legally, to
exclude some farmers of an enlarged EU from such
payments or, in other words, to discriminate and pay
richer farmers of the EU-15 direct payments, which may
help them to outstrip the CEEC farmers on the domestic
enlarged market.
In this respect, the Commission proposes that, instead
of making these payments to the CEEC farmers directly,
a significant amount of funds could be made available for
additional rural development and environmental
programmes, to reshape their agricultural economies
and promote convergence with the EU.
The question now arises as to how significant the
proposed amount included into the Agenda’s proposals
could be (about ECU 5 billion dedicated to the applicant
countries out of almost 50 billion dedicated to the present
Member States). In that respect, it seems certain that the
issue of the direct compensatory payments to farmers is
going to dominate the debate in the forthcoming
negotiations.
7. Integrated Rural Policy
Concerning the proposals for an integrated rural policy,
also included in the Agenda, the Commission accepts
that, although the relative economic weight of agriculture
continues to decline, farmers must be helped, as long as
the necessary adjustment process of CAP takes place, by
securing a reasonable and stable income levels which are
vital for farming.
To the extent that farmers’ income can no longer be
sustained via price support policies and that direct
payments in the form of 1992 compensation schemes are
under question, there is an increasing awareness that one
should encourage farmers to continue farming.
In this respect, the concept of an integrated rural
development strategy, which was introduced in a
Conference in Cork, Ireland (November 1996), enters the
discussion, with the aim of raising the multi-functional
role that many farmers can play in generally managing
the countryside in the context of their rural rather than a
solely agricultural activity. The ‘Cork Declaration’ which
resulted from the Conference was considered to be a good
starting point for reflection on the shaping of a future
Common Rural Development Policy, calling for an
integrated approach under a ten-point programme. It was
however debated whether farmers would become pawns
rather than active players in agriculture through this
policy.
Although the farm Ministers did not accept the
inclusion of the Cork Declaration into the Summit
conclusions of that time (Dublin, December 1996), the
concept of overall sustainable development was ultimately
included in the Amsterdam Treaty (June 1997), as one of
the EU’s objectives from now on. This indicates that
progress must be made towards environmentally
sustainable production and consumption.
Up to now, relevant EU action was rather limited to
the development of various measures and programmes,
the sum of which gradually formed the structural
dimension of CAP. The financing of this action, however,
never exceeded the 5% of the total Funds of FEOGA. To
this extent, although the reformed structural policy has
stressed the attention to rural development aspects by
introducing the accompanying measures (for the
environment, afforestation, early retirement), it is argued
that in the years to come there must be an optimum
mobilization of synergies in order to make progress in an
integrated rural policy.
To this extent, it is questionable whether this target is
served by the Commission’s proposal to take rural
development aspects (applied in less favoured areas of
Objectives 1, 5.a and 5.b) out of the Structural Funds
programme and consider them simply as accompanying
measures, co-financed by the Guarantee (and not the
Guidance) Section of FEOGA.
Finally, it should be noted that the adaptation of the29
CAP in the light of enlargement to the east will be
influenced by some other developments on the horizon.
The most important may be the introduction of a single
currency in 1999 in those Member States that meet the
convergence criteria laid down in the Maastricht Treaty.
The prospect that certain Members will not be ready to
introduce the single currency means that, most probably,
the agri-monetary system will continue in some form
after 1999. In that case, enlargement will have further
implications on the CAP, depending on the relevant rules
which will be adopted for the new Members.
The Luxembourg European Summit (12-13 December
1997) reached a final decision on the whole issue of
Agenda 2000. Concerning the CAP, the Summit
concluded that ‘the process of reform begun in 1992
should be continued, deepened, adapted and completed,
extending it to Mediterranean production. The reform
should lead to economically sound, viable solutions
which are socially acceptable and make it possible to
ensure fair income, to strike a fair balance between
production sectors, producers and regions and to avoid
distortion of competition.’
After this decision, the Commission is bound to issue,
in the first half of 1998, concrete legislative proposals for
the reform of each product, guided by the orientations of
the Agriculture Council on 17-18/11/1997, including
proposals for reforms of the olive oil, wine and tobacco
regimes plus rural development measures.
RÉSUMÉ
La PAC, qui depuis ses débuts est la plus importante des
politiques (sectorielles) de l’UE, continue à être au coeur
même de l’intégration européenne.
Jusqu’en 1992, l’orientation de base de la PAC était
de fournir un cadre de soutien et de protection aux
produits agricoles, basé presqu’exclusivement sur un
mécanisme de soutien des prix, afin d’accroître la
production et la productivité agricoles et garantir les
revenus agricoles. Une fois que ces objectifs avaient été
pratiquement réalisés, un certain nombre d’autres
problèmes surgirent, notamment la dépense budgétaire
élevée nécessaire pour financer le coût de la PAC et
l’apparition d’une certaine instabilité du marché causée
par des excédents de produits que les marchés interne et
externe n’étaient pas en mesure d’absorber.
Après plusieurs ajustements de la politique opérés
dans les années 80, une vaste réforme de la PAC fut mise
en chantier en 1992 (la réforme McSharry); celle-ci
constituait un pas décisif vers l’orientation de marché du
secteur, en modifiant progressivement le mécanisme de
base de la PAC d’un système de soutien des prix en un
soutien direct des revenus. En effet, la réforme se traduisit
par des réductions considérables des prix communs
élevés pratiqués précédemment, réduisant par là le fossé
entre les prix de la Communauté et les prix mondiaux,
sans pour autant l’éliminer complètement.
Cependant, l’état actuel des priorités, conjugué aux
autres développements politiques et socio-économiques
(le futur élargissement, le prochain Round de l’OMC, les
contraintes budgétaires, le risque de futurs déséquilibres
de marché, les considérations d’ordre régional et
environnemental, etc.), plaide en faveur d’un
approfondissement de la réforme de la PAC.
La batterie de mesures proposées dans le document
“Agenda 2000” de la Commission européenne (juillet
1997) a ouvert le débat en proposant de poursuivre la
réforme de 1992 à partir de l’an 2000, afin de faire passer
l’ensemble du secteur agricole vers une plus grande
orientation de marché et une compétitivité accrue des
produits agricoles, et de mettre un plus grand accent sur
les politiques de développement rural et sur une
agriculture qui soit à la fois davantage soucieuse de la
qualité et respectueuse de l’environnement.
Dans ses conclusions, le Sommet européen de
Luxembourg (décembre 1997) a pratiquement accepté
les orientations de la Commission et l’a invitée à soumettre
des propositions concrètes dans les prochains mois, pour
la réforme de l’Organisation commune des marchés
agricoles, qui devrait à l’avenir indiquer plus clairement
la portée et les implications de la réforme envisagée.
Ce train de mesures comporte certainement d’autres
modifications importantes de la PAC; dès lors, on peut
s’attendre à ce que le débat sur l’avenir de la PAC gagne
en intensité dans les prochains mois, voire les prochaines
années.
______________
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